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INTRODUCTION

This case note will focus on the Supreme Court’s decision in
Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Simmonds. 1 The case focused
on the issue of whether equitable tolling principles should be applied
to the section 16(b) provision of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and, if so, what standard for equitable tolling should be applied—
generally established principles or a derivative version. 2
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was created
to monitor stock creation and trading. 3 Section 16 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 4 sets out the guidelines for short-term stock
trading by “[d]irectors, officers, and principal stockholders.” 5
Section 16(a) addresses the disclosure of trading activities by
corporate insiders. 6 Section 16(b) prohibits insider trading based on

* Lydia Park is a third-year student at Pepperdine University School of
Law and a Literary Citation Editor for the Journal of the National Association of
Administrative Law Judiciary. Before attending law school, Lydia worked five
years in Investor Relations at Hyundai Motor Company, and prior to that, she
worked in Marketing Strategy and Brand Management. Lydia would like to thank
her entire family, but especially her parents, who have been and always will be her
inspiration. Lastly, she would like to thank the Lord for giving her a little more
time to live out her life on this Earth.
1

132 S. Ct. 1414 (2012).
See generally id.
3
See generally U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
http://www.sec.gov/index.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2013); see infra Part II.B and
notes 32–35 for more details on its creation.
4
15 U.S.C. § 78p (2012).
5
Id.
6
15 U.S.C. § 78p(a). The term “insider” usually describes a director,
officer, or principal stockholder. Also, the SEC describes “insider trading” in the
following manner:
2

“Insider trading” is a term that most investors have
heard and usually associate with illegal conduct. But the term
actually includes both legal and illegal conduct. The legal
version is when corporate insiders—officers, directors, and
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short-swing profits—the purchase and sale of shares within six
months—and creates a cause of action for the breach of that
prohibition. Section 16(a)(1) reads:
Every person who is directly or indirectly the
beneficial owner of more than 10 percent of any class
of any equity security (other than an exempted
security) which is registered pursuant to section 78l of
this title, or who is a director or an officer of the issuer
of such security, shall file the statements required by
this subsection with the Commission. 7
Thus, the ten percent shareholding threshold applies only to
“beneficial owners” who are not directors or officers. 8 Section 16(b),
which is the relevant statute in the case at hand, reads in part: “any
profit realized by [a beneficial owner, director, or officer] from any
purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of
[an] issuer . . . within any period of less than six months . . . shall
inure to and be recoverable by the issuer . . . .” 9 The statute allows
suit to be brought by either the issuer or by an owner of the issuer’s

employees—buy and sell stock in their own companies.
When corporate insiders trade in their own securities, they
must report their trades to the SEC. . . .
Illegal insider trading refers generally to buying or
selling a security, in breach of a fiduciary duty or other
relationship of trust and confidence, while in possession of
material, nonpublic information about the security.
Education, Fast Answers: Insider Trading, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/answers/insider.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2013).
7
15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)(1).
8
A “beneficial owner” is the actual owner of the shares who holds voting
power. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d–3 (2013). For details on what qualifies as a registered
stock, see 15 U.S.C. § 78l.
9
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b).
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shares. 10 The statute sets the statute of limitations to no more than
two years after a profit was made. 11
Simmonds brought to the Supreme Court, among other topics
for debate, the issue of whether the statute of limitations set by
section 16(b) can be tolled. 12 The well-established purpose of a
statute of limitations is “to protect defendants against stale or unduly
delayed claims.” 13 The equitable tolling doctrine is a judicially
created doctrine that essentially tolls the statute of limitations to
protect a person from fraudulent concealment of an unlawful act. 14
Before the Supreme Court’s decision in this case, the
following three-way split existed among courts across the country:
(1) no application of equitable tolling (e.g., District Court for the
Eastern District of Tennessee); (2) application of generally
established principles of equitable tolling (e.g., Delaware State Court
of Chancery); and (3) application of an altered principle of equitable
tolling (e.g., Ninth and Second Circuits). 15 The Court’s decision in
Simmonds essentially narrows the scope by eliminating the third
method. 16 The Court’s opinion on the issue of whether equitable
tolling even applies at all is less satisfactory, as it merely assumed
tolling only for the purpose of determining the narrower issue of
whether the Ninth Circuit’s rationale was valid or not. 17 The opinion,
although divided and without precedential effect, affirms the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s rejection of the petitioner’s
“contention that § 16(b) establishes a period of repose that is not
subject to tolling.” 18

10

Id.; see also infra Part II.B.2.
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b).
12
See Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. 1414, 1417
11

(2012).
13

Id. at 1420 (citing John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S.
130, 133 (2008)).
14
See infra Part II.C–D for an in-depth discussion of the equitable tolling
doctrine.
15
See infra Part II.D.1.
16
Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. at 1418, 1421 n.7; see infra Part II.D.1.a.
17
Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. at 1419, 1421.
18
Id. at 1421.
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This case note will focus on the non-precedential, yet
important, decision made in Simmonds. Because Supreme Court
decisions carry the utmost authority, it essentially leaves only one
option for circuit courts—case-by-case review under the traditional
equitable tolling doctrine. However, because the Court made certain
to explicitly state that its decision on whether section 16(b)’s time
limit is a limitation or a repose carries no precedent, lower courts
have been left with the freedom to ascertain for themselves
congressional intent on the matter.
Part II of this case note will lay out the applicable statutes and
judicial principles, examining how the courts have applied them to
their decisions prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Simmonds.
Parts III and IV will comment on the relevant facts of the case
and the issues brought up in the lower court proceedings, then move
on to the Court’s opinion—including the level of deference the Court
has afforded congressional intent when analyzing section 16(b) and
the Court’s rationale in eliminating the prevalent third school of
thought (altered principle) on equitable tolling. These sections will
also explain the implications of the Court’s decision to focus on
certain issues and not others.
Part V of this note will follow with an analysis of the reaction
from the legal community and other related industries, and will
examine how the Simmonds decision has impacted the circuit courts
in applying the relevant statutes and principles. Then the section will
review Supreme Court findings in related or similar circumstances—
namely, the Court’s rationale regarding application of equitable
tolling for section 10(b) antifraud claims under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934—and review the circuit court decisions
subsequent to Simmonds, in order to assess what the circuit split may
be in the future and how the Supreme Court might rule if the same
issue were to come up at a later date. The note will also review
important congressional reactions enacted subsequent to the Supreme
Court holdings on equitable tolling for section 10(b) claims in order
to assess legislative intent for statute of limitations in securities law
and whether the Court correctly identified such intent.
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A. Pre-Federal Securities Legislation Era
The Supreme Court has stated that “[c]orporations are
creatures of state law, and investors commit their funds to corporate
directors on the understanding that, except where federal law
expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect to
stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the
corporation.” 19 Today, state laws continue to govern many aspects
related to corporations—for example, corporate governance.
However, after state laws proved lacking, the area of securities
regulations received express federal governance.
1.

State Blue Sky Laws

Blue Sky Laws are securities laws enacted by individual
states. 20 These laws originated before Congress passed the Securities
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, or even before
Congress formed a centralized commission to oversee the securities
markets. 21 The prominence of questionable securities-related
practices became the impetus for regulating the promotion of
“fraudulently valued securities.” 22 In 1911, the state of Kansas first
passed a securities act in this respect, which attracted the attention of
other states and was “popularly called a ‘blue sky law[].’” 23 These
19

Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (emphasis

added).
20

Education, Fast Answers: Blue Sky Laws, U.S. SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/answers/bluesky.htm (last
visited Oct. 23, 2013).
21
See infra note 23 and accompanying text; see also infra Part II.B.
22
ROBERT W. HAMILTON, JONATHAN R. MACEY & DOUGLAS K. MOLL,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 304–05 (11th ed. 2010).
23
JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, 4 TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS § 27:3 (3d ed. 2010). The term “blue sky law” derives itself from
the “purpose to protect the Kansas farmers against the industrialists selling them a
piece of the blue sky.” HAMILTON, MACEY & MOLL, supra note 22, at 305.
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state securities laws, now in effect in all the states, “protect investors
against issuers having nothing behind their securities but water or
blue sky.” 24 Blue Sky Laws attempt to “prevent unscrupulous
dealers foisting on inexperienced persons unfair, spurious, and
worthless securities, and further to provide some method of
supervision and regulation of the marketplace.” 25
Despite these attempts to prevent fraudulent securities
transactions at the state level, these laws have not been very effective
on a national level. 26 The state laws “required that all securities
registered thereunder ‘qualify’ on a merit basis,” and for a while this
“broad regulatory potential” approach pushed back federal
involvement until the Wall Street crash of 1929. 27
2.

The Beginnings of Federal Involvement in the Regulatory
Landscape

After the 1929 crash, Congress passed the Securities Act of
1933 (1933 Act), also known as the “Truth in Securities” Act. 28
Congress had considered and rejected the “merit approach” of the
state blue sky laws, “opting instead for a system of full disclosure”
under the theory “that investors are adequately protected if all . . .

24

COX & HAZEN, supra note 23, at § 27:3:

As one court put it: “The name that is given to the law
indicates the evil at which it is aimed, that is, ‘speculative
schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of “blue
sky’’’; or, as [it has been] stated, . . . ‘to stop the sale of stock
in fly-by-night concerns, visionary oil wells, distant gold
mines, and other like fraudulent exploitations.”’
Id. (alteration in original) (footnote omitted).
25
Id.
26
HAMILTON, MACEY & MOLL, supra note 22, at 305.
27
Id. The crash of the stock market in 1929, which marked the beginning
of the ten-year era known as The Great Depression, was “viewed as the straw that
broke the camel’s back.” Id.
28
Id.
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aspects of the securities being marketed are fully and fairly disclosed
and thus there is no need for the more time-consuming merit analysis
of the securities being offered.” 29 The Federal Trade Commission
administered this “limited” act until Congress passed the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 the next year. 30
B. Adoption of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Section 16’s
Prohibition of Insider Trading
After enactment of the 1933 Act, which governed the
registration of securities to “enable[] investors . . . to make informed
judgments about whether to purchase a company’s securities,” 31
Congress passed the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) and
simultaneously created the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC). 32 The 1934 Act grants the SEC “broad authority over all
aspects of the securities industry”—it “identifies and prohibits certain

29

Id.
Id. Although the 1933 Act contained both “private remedies for
investors who are injured due to violations” and “general anti-fraud provisions
which bar material omissions and misrepresentations in connection with the sale of
securities,” it was limited because it only addressed “distributions of securities” and
protected only those investors who were “purchasers of securities.” Id. at 305–06.
31
About the SEC, The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, U.S.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml
(last visited Oct. 23, 2013) [hereinafter The Laws that Govern the Securities
Industry].
32
Id.; see also HAMILTON, MACEY & MOLL, supra note 22, at 306
(footnotes omitted):
30

In 1934 Congress enacted the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 which is a more omnibus regulation. The extent
of the regulation was so vast that Congress felt it was not
possible to continue overburdening the Federal Trade
Commission with this new administrative responsibility and
thus established the Securities and Exchange Commission
[“SEC”] which is now one of the largest federal agencies. The
Exchange Act of 1934 is directed at regulating all aspects of
public trading of securities.
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types of conduct in the [securities] markets and provides the [SEC]
with disciplinary powers over regulated entities and persons
associated with them.” 33 The SEC’s self-proclaimed mission is “to
protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and
facilitate capital formation.” 34 In order to fulfill its dual purpose of
(1) “promot[ing] stability in the markets” and (2) “protect[ing]
investors,” the SEC oversees those who participate in securities
transactions in order to maintain fair dealings and prevent fraud. 35
1.

Insider Trading Provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934

One of the enumerated types of conduct prohibited by the Act
of 1934 is insider trading. 36 The SEC homepage offers insight into
the commission’s description of insider trading:
The securities laws broadly prohibit fraudulent
activities of any kind in connection with the offer,
purchase, or sale of securities. These provisions are
the basis for many types of disciplinary actions,
including actions against fraudulent insider trading.
Insider trading is illegal when a person trades a
security while in possession of material nonpublic
information in violation of a duty to withhold the
information or refrain from trading. 37

33

The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, supra note 31.
About the SEC, What We Do, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Oct. 23,
2013) [hereinafter What We Do].
35
Id.
36
The Laws that Govern the Securities Industry, supra note 31.
37
Id.
34
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Despite the fact that the SEC clearly states that protection of
investors is its most important mission, 38 one will not find an
“express statutory prohibition” of insider trading in the Securities
Acts. 39 As a result, “most insider trading cases are based on Rule
10b-5’s general antifraud provisions, which do not specifically
mention insider trading.” 40 There are three sections in the 1934 Act
that expressly address insider trading, but on a limited scope. Of
those, section 16(b) prohibits “short swing profit by designated
statutory insiders.” 41 The other sections only address remedies for
insider trading, but remain silent on the “substantive question of what
types of conduct comprise improper trading of nonpublic
information.” 42

38

“Congress established the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1934
to enforce the newly-passed securities laws, to promote stability in the markets and,
most importantly, to protect investors.” What We Do, supra note 34 (emphasis
added).
39
4 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES
REGULATION § 12.17 (6th ed. 2009).
40
Id.
41
Id.; see also supra Part I and text accompanying note 9.
42
HAZEN, supra note 39. Section 20A(a) designates a private right of
action against contemporaneous trading based on inside information:
Any person who violates any provision of this title or
the rules or regulations thereunder by purchasing or selling a
security while in possession of material, non-public
information shall be liable in an action in any court of
competent jurisdiction to any person who, contemporaneously
with the purchase or sale of securities that is the subject of
such violation, has purchased (where such violation is based
on a sale of securities) or sold (where such violation is based
on a purchase of securities) securities of the same class.
15 U.S.C. § 78t-1 (2012). Classes of securities are “[t]ypes of listed company stock
that are differentiated by the level of voting rights shareholders receive.”
Dictionary,
Class
of
Shares,
INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/class.asp (last visited Mar. 18, 2013).
Section 21A(a)(1) addresses the SEC’s authority to seek civil penalties for insider
trading:
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Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934

Section 16 is a “regulatory framework enacted by Congress to
proscribe the use of confidential information by corporate insiders in
the trading of equity of their issuers. 43 The section specifically deals
with a narrow subset of “stock trading often associated with the
misuse of inside information—short-swing trading.” 44

Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any
person has violated any provision of this title or the rules or
regulations thereunder by purchasing or selling a security or
security-based swap agreement while in possession of
material, nonpublic information in, or has violated any such
provision by communicating such information in connection
with, a transaction on or through the facilities of a national
securities exchange or from or through a broker or dealer, and
which is not part of a public offering by an issuer of securities
other than standardized options or security futures products,
the Commission—
(A) may bring an action in a United States district
court to seek, and the court shall have jurisdiction to
impose, a civil penalty to be paid by the person who
committed such violation; and
(B) may, subject to subsection (b)(1), bring an action
in a United States district court to seek, and the court
shall have jurisdiction to impose, a civil penalty to be
paid by a person who, at the time of the violation,
directly or indirectly controlled the person who
committed such violation.
15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(a)(1).
43
15 U.S.C. § 78p.
44
ALAN PALMITER & FRANK PARTNOY, CORPORATIONS: A
CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 891 (2010). Short-swing trading is a “purchase and
resale . . . of company stock within a relatively short period of time.” Id. The
original rationale for the six-month period defining “short-swing” in the provision
comes from the fact that the “capital gains period of the tax laws was then six
months, [so] there was good reason to suspect that . . . someone . . . who bought
and sold within six months,” foregoing tax advantages for longer-held profits, “was
doing so to take advantage of some special knowledge.” Id.
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Section 16 seeks to prevent such abuses of inside information
by means of a threefold attack. 45 Section 16(a) requires insiders to
make SEC filings of shareholding and transactions; section 16(b)
creates a private cause of action for the issuer or shareholder to bring
a claim to recover the “short-swing” profits made by insiders; and
section 16(c) “prohibits such insiders from transacting short sales in
the issuer’s equity securities.” 46 Through such a threefold attack,
Congress intended to “curb the evils of insider trading [by] . . . taking
the profits out of a class of transactions in which the possibility of
abuse was believed to be intolerably great.” 47 Section 16(b)
explicitly states that the purpose of the section is to “prevent[] the
unfair use of information which may have been obtained . . . by
reason of [a] relationship to the issuer” for short-swing profits. 48

45

Marc I. Steinberg & Daryl L. Landsdale, Jr., The Judicial and
Regulatory Constriction of Section 16(B) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 33, 34 (1992).
46
Id. at 34.
47
Id. at 36 (quoting Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S.
418, 422 (1972)). The Supreme Court in Reliance held that the only effective
method is a “flat rule.” 404 U.S. at 422; see also Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d
693 (7th Cir. 1970) (holding that strict liability applies regardless of intent).
48
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b).
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of
information which may have been obtained by such beneficial
owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship to the
issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale,
or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer
(other than an exempted security) . . . within any period of less
than six months, unless such security . . . was acquired in good
faith in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall
inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any
intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or
officer in entering into such transaction . . . . Suit to recover
such profit may be instituted at law or in equity in any court of
competent jurisdiction by the issuer, or by the owner of any
security of the issuer in the name and in behalf of the issuer if
the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within sixty
days after the request or shall fail diligently to prosecute the
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a. Standard of Application of Section 16(b)
The correct standard to apply when analyzing a claim under
section 16(b) is the objective approach—“where alternative
constructions of the terms of § 16(b) are possible, those terms are to
be given the construction that best serves the congressional purpose
of curbing short-swing speculation by corporate insiders” 49—unless
the circumstances represent a borderline situation that calls for a
subjective and pragmatic approach—“courts inquire whether the
transaction involved carries a potential for insider abuse. Only those
types of transactions which do are then found included within the
statutory scope.” 50 But otherwise, for “garden-variety transaction[s]
which cannot be regarded as unorthodox, the pragmatic approach is
not applicable.” 51
b. Section 16(b)’s Two-Year Statute of Limitations
Section 16(b)’s private right of action also contains a
prescribed time limitation: “no such suit shall be brought more than
two years after the date such profit was realized.” 52 This portion of
the statute is the central issue in Simmonds, which the Supreme Court
addressed before considering the merits of the case. Can this statute
of limitations be tolled, and if so, when does the clock begin to run?

same thereafter; but no such suit shall be brought more than
two years after the date such profit was realized.
Id. (emphasis added).
49
See Whittaker v. Whittaker Corp., 639 F.2d 516, 522 (9th Cir. 1981)
(quoting Reliance, 404 U.S. at 424), abrogated by Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC
v. Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. 1414 (2012)) (citation omitted).
50
Whittaker, 639 F.2d at 522 (quoting Kern Cnty. Land Co. v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 594–95 (1973)).
51
Id.
52
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b).
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c. The Underwriter Exemption to Section 16(b)
The SEC “has relaxed a number of rules in this area”
regarding section 16(b) claims. 53 This includes relaxing rules
regarding: (1) an insider’s exercise of an option and immediate sale
of underlying security after the six-month holding period, and (2) the
purchase or sale by an “individual before . . . [becoming] an officer
or director and the subsequent offsetting transaction after such person
attains insider status.” 54
Regarding underwriters, “The SEC has carved out an
underwriter exemption to both disclosure under 16(a) and
disgorgement under 16(b) . . . when acting in good faith and in the
ordinary course of business.” 55 The “underwriter exemption,” as it
has come to be known, originated in 1935 under a rule called NB2
that exempted “certain transactions by underwriters from the
provisions of Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.” 56 The
conditions of this exemption were relaxed on several occasions, 57 and
the current exemption standard can be found under 17 C.F.R. §
240.16a-7(a) for exemption from 16(a) disclosures, 58 and under 17
53

Steinberg & Landsdale, supra note 45, at 38.
See id.
55
Boris Rappoport, Discovering Concealment: Defining the Limits of
Equitable Tolling in Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 7 DUKE J.
CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 171, 172 (2012), available at
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/djclpp_sidebar/85/ (describing the reasons that the
SEC has given for the exemptions in this section).
56
Exchange Act Release No. 264, 1935 WL 29156, at *1 (June 8, 1935).
57
See ARNOLD S. JACOBS, 5A DISCLOSURE AND REMEDIES UNDER THE
SECURITIES LAWS § 4:202 (2005); see also Exchange Act Release No. 535, 1936
WL 31535 (Mar. 19, 1936); Amendment to Rule NB2, Exchange Act Release No.
1080, 1937 WL 31412 (Feb. 27, 1937); Exchange Act Release No. 3907, 1947 WL
25432 (Jan. 29, 1947); Exchange Act Release No. 4719 (June 18, 1952); Adoption
of Amendments, Exchange Act Release No. 4754, 1952 WL 47481 (Sept. 24,
1952); Exchange Act Release No. 6103, 1959 WL 7138 (Oct. 29, 1959); Exchange
Act Release No. 6131, 1959 WL 7166 (Dec. 4, 1959).
58
See 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-7(a) (2013). The provision exempts anyone
“engaged in the business of distributing securities” who participates in a
“distribution of a substantial block of securities” as long as he or she “participat[es]
in good faith, in the ordinary course of such business.” Id. § 240.16a-7(a)(1).
54
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C.F.R. § 240.16a-10 for exemption from section 16(b): “Except as
provided in § 240.16a-6, any transaction exempted from the
requirements of section 16(a) of the Act, insofar as it is otherwise
subject to the provisions of section 16(b), shall be likewise exempt
from section 16(b) of the Act.” 59
The original suit in Simmonds involved a challenge to this
exemption. 60 However, the Supreme Court did not reach the merits
of this challenge due to its ruling on the statute of limitations and
equitable tolling. 61
C. The Equitable Tolling Doctrine
The equitable tolling doctrine is a judicially created
principle. 62 The doctrine attempts to harmonize the two contrasting
policy considerations of minimizing unfairness arising from: (1) the
bar that the statute of limitations places on litigants acting with a
good faith effort; and (2) outdated and stale claims that should have,
and could have, been brought at an earlier time. 63 However, to
mitigate an influx of claims under such an “extraordinary remedy,”
both the legislative and judicial branches have “limited [it] to rare
and exceptional circumstances” and “applied [it] sparingly.” 64 To
understand the doctrine, it is necessary not only to address the

59

Id. § 240.16a-10.
See infra Part III.A–B for a detailed discussion of the claims brought by
Simmonds against the underwriters.
61
See Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. 1414, 1419
(2012).
62
Arivella v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 623 F. Supp. 2d 164, 176 (D. Mass.
2009).
63
Machules v. Dep’t of Admin., 523 So. 2d 1132, 1134 (Fla. 1988) (“The
tolling doctrine is used in the interests of justice to accommodate both a
defendant’s right not to be called upon to defend a stale claim and a plaintiff's right
to assert a meritorious claim when equitable circumstances have prevented a timely
filing.”); see also Naton v. Bank of Cal., 649 F.2d 691, 696 (9th Cir. 1981)
(explaining that “equitable tolling . . . focuses on the plaintiff's excusable ignorance
of the limitations period and on lack of prejudice to the defendant.”).
64
54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 134 (2010) (footnote omitted).
60
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doctrine’s principles, but to briefly touch upon the principles of
equitable estoppel, statute of limitations, statute of repose, and the
application of the doctrine by federal and state legislatures.
1.

Origin and General Application

Equitable tolling is judicially created; 65 nevertheless it “has a
legal basis arising out of common law.” 66 It “permits a plaintiff to
sue after the statutory time period has expired if he or she has been
prevented from doing so due to inequitable circumstances.” 67 In the
case of fraud, the clock does not start to tick for a statute of
limitations until “discovery of the fraud ‘where the party injured by
the fraud remains in ignorance of it without any fault or want of
diligence or care on his part.’” 68
The burden of persuasion lies with the party seeking
application of equitable tolling, where the party must “establish a
compelling basis for awarding such relief.” 69 This “compelling
basis” standard attaches a narrow standard and safeguards against
overextending the doctrine. 70 Courts determine whether or not to
apply the doctrine with a case-by-case review. 71
In Pace v. DiGuglielmo, the Supreme Court set the prima
facie case for the equitable tolling doctrine to apply. 72 The Court

65

Arivella, 623 F. Supp. 2d at 176.
51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 153 (2011).
67
54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 134 (footnote omitted).
68
Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. 1414, 1420
(2012) (quoting Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S.
350, 363 (1991)).
69
54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 134 (footnote omitted). Sufficient
basis have included “when the plaintiff has been mislead [sic] or lulled into
inaction, has in some extraordinary way been prevented from asserting his or her
rights, or has timely asserted his or her rights mistakenly in the wrong forum.” Id.
(footnote omitted); see also Nicks v. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof’l, etc., 957 So. 2d 65
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
70
54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 134.
71
Id.
72
544 U.S. 408 (2005).
66
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concluded that “[g]enerally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling bears
the burden of establishing two elements: (1) that he has been
pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary
circumstance stood in his way.” 73 In instances of fraudulent
concealment of facts, equitable tolling “ceases when those facts are,
or should have been, discovered by the plaintiff.” 74
2.

Equitable Tolling and Equitable Estoppel

The main difference between equitable tolling and equitable
estoppel lies in the fact that the tolling doctrine does not require any
fault or wrongful conduct by the defendant. 75 Although it is often the
case that a plaintiff does not discover the facts for a cause of action
because of some sort of fraudulent misconduct on the part of the
defendant, the tolling doctrine applies equally for other reasons
unrelated to the defendant’s conduct. 76 On the other hand, equitable
estoppel is “intended to prevent a party from taking unconscionable
advantage of its own wrong.” 77 The equitable estoppel doctrine
“always presupposes error on one side and fault or fraud upon the

73

Id. at 418.
Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. 1414, 1420
(2012) (citing 2 CALVIN W. CORMAN, LIMITATION OF ACTIONS § 9.7.1, at 55–57
(1991)).
75
54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 134.
76
51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitations of Actions § 154 (2011). For example, the
doctrine
74

[P]ermits a court to excuse a plaintiff's failure to comply with
a statute of limitations where because of disability,
irremediable lack of information, or other circumstances
beyond his or her control, the plaintiff cannot reasonably be
expected to file suit on time. Accordingly, ignorance of a
statutory deadline based on lack of notice or inadequate notice
may provide a proper basis for equitable tolling.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
77
28 AM. JUR. 2D Estoppel and Waiver § 29.
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other and some defect of which it would be inequitable for the party
against whom the doctrine is asserted to take advantage.” 78
3.

Statute of Limitations and Statute of Repose

The Corpus Juris Secundum differentiates the statute of
limitations from the statute of repose in the following simple
distinction: “A statute of limitations governs the time within which
an action must be commenced after the cause of action accrues. A
statute of repose, however, limits the time within which an action
may be brought and is not related to the accrual of any cause of
action . . . .” 79 Although they are similar concepts in affording the
defendant some respite from having an action brought against him or
her after a prescribed time period, the difference in determination of
when the clock should start to tick provides a very stark contrast—
“Unlike an ordinary statute of limitations, which begins running upon
accrual of the claim, the period specified in a statute of repose begins
when a specific event occurs, regardless of whether a cause of action
has accrued or whether any injury has resulted.” 80 Thus, for a statute
of repose, the “injury need not have occurred, much less have been
discovered.” 81
Simply put, a statute of limitations bars a plaintiff from
bringing a claim if it is not brought within a prescribed time period,
whereas a statute of repose bars a claim if it is not brought after a
prescribed time period—the former is a conditional statute while the
latter is an absolute statute. 82 Therefore, it is crucial to determine
whether the prescribed period of time in a statute is intended to be
one or the other for equitable tolling purposes. A finding of repose
will completely bar a potential plaintiff from bringing a stale or

78

Id. § 28 (footnote omitted).
54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 7 (2010) (footnote omitted).
80
Id. (footnote omitted).
81
Id. (footnote omitted).
82
Id.
79
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outdated claim, no matter how unfair it may be for the diligent
plaintiff. 83
4.

Application to Statutes and Legislative Intent

Generally, it has been stated that application of equitable
tolling to a statute depends on underlying policies:
[E]quitable tolling of a statute of limitations is
appropriate when consistent with the policies
underlying the statute and the purposes underlying the
statute of limitations, and equitable tolling is not
permissible if it is inconsistent with the text of the
relevant statute. Even in the absence of an explicit
prohibition on equitable tolling of the statute of
limitations, a court may conclude that either the text of
the statute or a manifest legislative policy underlying
it cannot be reconciled with permitting equitable
tolling. 84
In Rotella v. Wood, the Supreme Court stated, “federal
statutes of limitations are generally subject to equitable principles of
tolling.” 85 In a subsequent case, the Court explained, “Congress must
be presumed to draft limitations periods in light of this background
principle” of equitable tolling, especially when it is enacting
limitations to be applied by bankruptcy courts, which are courts of
equity that apply the principles and rules of equity jurisprudence. 86
Factors for assessing whether a certain statute of limitations has
assumed the presumption of equitable tolling include, but are not
limited to: “(1) the statute’s detail, (2) its technical language, (3) its
83

Id.
51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 153 (2011) (footnotes omitted).
85
528 U.S. 549, 560 (2000); see also 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions §
84

134.
86

Young v. United States, 535 U.S. 43, 49–50 (2002); see also 54 C.J.S.
Limitations of Actions § 134.
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multiple iterations of the limitations period in procedural and
substantive form, (4) its explicit inclusion of exceptions, and (5) its
underlying subject matter.” 87 And so, although federal statutes of
limitations are presumed to apply equitable tolling, each statute
should be carefully reviewed to determine whether Congress wished
to exclude the statute from this general principle.
For claims regarding the federal securities laws, the statute of
limitations begins to run from the offer, sale, or delivery by the
defendant, whichever occurred last. 88 Although Congress has clearly
expressed its intent in other areas of securities law, 89 it has
unfortunately remained silent as to section 16(b)’s statute of
limitations and tolling—“No congressional debate exists on the
statute of limitations provision since it was inserted in the conference
report.” 90
D. Historical Application of Equitable Tolling to Section 16(b)
Claims in the Federal Courts
This section will first address the methods of equitable tolling
applied by different Circuit Courts regarding section 16(b)
litigation—notably, the Ninth and Second Circuits. Then the section
will discuss the Supreme Court’s application of equitable tolling
principles to other areas of federal law before moving to a discussion
of the facts and holdings of Simmonds in Part III. 91

87

54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 134 (footnote omitted).
54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 287; see also Doran v. Petroleum
Mgmt. Corp., 576 F.2d 91, 93 (5th Cir. 1978) (“The relevant inquiry was which of
the defendant's activities—offer, sale, or delivery—occurred last as that was the
time from which to measure the limitation period.”).
89
See infra Part V.C for a discussion of the Court’s interpretation of the
Rule 10b-5 anti-fraud statute and Congress’s subsequent enactment of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which manifested legislative intent as to the statute of
limitations/repose for Rule 10b-5.
90
1 ARNOLD S. JACOBS, SECTION 16 OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT §
3:52 (2011) (footnote omitted).
91
The Supreme Court has addressed other issues regarding section 16(b),
but it did not address the issue of equitable tolling for this provision until 2012 in
88
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Lower Court Three-Way Split

Traditionally, three schools of thought have been established
regarding the equitable tolling doctrine’s application to section 16(b)
claims:
(1) the two-year period runs strictly from the time the
profits were realized, without any tolling; (2) the twoyear period is tolled until the corporation ha[s]
sufficient information to put it on notice of its
potential section 16(b) claim; and (3) the “disclosure
rationale,” namely, that the two-year period is tolled
until the insider discloses the transactions at issue by
filing the required section 16(a) reports. 92
In Chambliss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Corp., the plaintiff shareholders
brought a claim under the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act. 93 Among
other things, the plaintiff brought claim under
78p because the transaction . . . was effectively a
‘buying’ by the Class ‘B’ stockholders (and
specifically by defendant Mashburn, an owner of more
than 10 percentum . . . . The transaction was not
reported to the Securities Exchange Commission, and
the profit realized by the buyers has not been reported
to such Commission. 94
However, the statute of limitations for the Securities Acts
ranges from one to three years. 95 Thus, the 6th Circuit affirmed the

Simmonds. See Gollust v. Mendell, 501 U.S. 115, 123–24 (1991) (analyzing the
terms “security,” “issuer,” and “instituted” within the provision).
92
Steinberg & Landsdale, supra note 45, at 55 (footnotes omitted).
93
414 F.2d 256 (6th Cir. 1969), aff’g 274 F. Supp. 401 (E.D. Tenn. 1967).
94
Chambliss, 274 F. Supp. at 407 (quotation marks omitted).
95
See infra note 195.
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District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee’s ruling 96 that the
“limitation periods provided in the federal securities acts cited herein
are not tolled, for the purpose of an action filed at least fifteen
months and as much as thirty-nine months after the expiration of
such limitations periods, by the commencement of a prior action
within such limitations periods . . . .” 97
a.

Ninth and Second Circuit Courts’ Decisions on Section 16(b)
Equitable Tolling

Out of the thirteen circuit courts to have considered these
issues, the Second and Ninth Circuit generally carry more supportive
authority than the other circuits. 98 An excerpt from The Leadership
Conference on Civil and Human Rights’ website nicely summarizes
the Ninth Circuit’s influence:
The Ninth Circuit is comprised of nine
states—California, Nevada, Oregon, Washington,
Idaho, Arizona, Montana, Alaska, and Hawaii. Fifty-

96

Chambliss, 414 F.2d at 257.
Chambliss, 274 F. Supp. at 411.
98
See infra notes 99–100 and accompanying text. This is true, aside from
the D.C. Circuit. Although all Court of Appeals are on the same “level,” some are
considered more influential than others:
97

The D.C. Circuit Court is generally considered the second most
powerful court (behind only the U.S. Supreme Court) in the
nation. The D.C. Circuit Court plays a critical role in national
security matters, has considerable regulatory review authority,
and is frequently a springboard for judges that are later
nominated to the Supreme Court.
Nathanael Bennet, Senate to Consider Controversial Judicial Nominee While No
One is Watching, ACLJ
(Dec. 5, 2011, 10:47 AM), http://aclj.org/usconstitution/senate-consider-controversial-judicial-nominee-no-one-watching.
Indeed, four of the current Justices of the Supreme Court hail from the D.C.
Circuit—Justices Scalia, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Chief Justice Roberts. See Carl
Tobias, Now Hiring: A Few Good Judges, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (Feb. 15,
2013), http://prospect.org/article/now-hiring-few-good-judges.
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four million Americans live in the states within the
Ninth Circuit's jurisdiction—more than any other
circuit. This means that one in six Americans is
potentially affected by the court’s rulings. 99
The Second Circuit includes New York, where many
financial institutions are headquartered, thus making it the authority
when it comes to securities law. 100 For the foregoing reasons (as well
as the fact that the present case was appealed from the Ninth Circuit),
it would be wise to discuss these courts’ application standards.
In contrast to Chambliss, the Ninth Circuit and Second Circuit
have applied tolling to section 16(b) claims—but with a variation on
the established methods of traditional equitable tolling. 101 In
Whittaker v. Whittaker Corp., the Court of Appeal for the Ninth
Circuit held that a section 16(b) statute of limitations is “tolled until
the insider discloses the transactions at issue in his mandatory section
16(a) reports,” regardless of whether the plaintiff knew or should
have known of the conduct at issue. 102 The Supreme Court
commented on the difference between this Ninth Circuit ruling,
commonly called the “Whittaker rule,” and conventional equitable
99

The Crucial Importance of the Ninth Circuit, THE LEADERSHIP
CONFERENCE ON CIVIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Apr. 14, 2003),
http://www.civilrights.org/judiciary/courts/ninth-circuit.html.
100
See Roberta S. Karmel, The Second Circuit's Role in Expanding the
SEC's Jurisdiction Abroad, 65 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 743, 743 (1991). The article
states:
The Second Circuit has had such a profound impact
on securities law that it has been referred to in this context as
the “Mother Court.” The breadth and significance of Second
Circuit securities law decisions is not surprising. New York
City is the financial center of both the United States and the
securities industry, and its legal advisors are located there.
Id. (footnote omitted).
101
See supra notes 93–97 and accompanying text.
102
639 F.2d 516, 527 (9th Cir. 1981), abrogated by Credit Suisse Sec.
(USA) LLC v. Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. 1414 (2012).
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tolling by stating that “some federal courts have used [the] term
[‘legal tolling’] to describe [the Whittaker rule] on the ground that the
rule ‘is derived from a statutory source,’ whereas equitable tolling is
‘judicially created.’” 103
In Litzler v. CC Investments, L.D.C., the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit stated, “We now hold that tolling of the
limitations period in Section 16(b), . . . using the relevant grace
periods of Section 16(a)(2) . . . is appropriate when a defendant has
failed to comply with the reporting requirements of Section 16(a).”104
The Second Circuit further stated that, “tolling should continue only
until the claimant or . . . the company gets actual notice that a person
subject to Section 16(a) has realized specific short-swing profits that
are worth pursuing.” 105
b.

Delaware’s Treatment of Equitable Tolling

Delaware is a particularly important state when it comes to
the law regarding corporations, business transactions, and
securities—Delaware has a separate Court of Chancery that “deals
largely with corporate issues, trusts, estates, other fiduciary matters,
disputes involving the purchase of land and questions of title to real
estate as well as commercial and contractual matters.” 106 Delaware
became the favored state of incorporation largely due to its
“hospitable climate for corporations.” 107 Because of Delaware’s

103

Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. 1414, 1419 n.6 (quoting Arivella v. Lucent
Techs., Inc., 623 F. Supp. 2d 164, 176 (D. Mass. 2009)).
104
362 F.3d 203, 207 (2d Cir. 2004), abrogated by Simmonds, 132 S. Ct.
1414 (2012) (citations omitted).
105
Litzler, 362 F.3d at 208 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
106
Overview,
DELAWARE
STATE
COURTS,
http://courts.delaware.gov/overview.stm (last visited Oct. 23, 2013).
107
HAMILTON, MACEY & MOLL, supra note 22, at 141. The book quotes
former Chief Justice Veasey of the Delaware Supreme Court in describing
Delaware’s current status in the corporate area:
Delaware has attracted over 300,000 corporations, including
more than half of the Fortune 500 and half of the New York
Stock Exchange corporations. It has also attracted some of the
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influence in business law applications, it would be informative to
peer into the state’s decisions regarding tolling of the statute of
limitations.
For a plaintiff to toll a statute of limitations in Delaware,
regardless of the theory on which the justification is based, “[the]
plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the statute was tolled,” and
“no theory will toll the statute beyond the point where the plaintiff
was objectively aware, or should have been aware, of facts giving
rise to the wrong.” 108 Thus, by adding the “should have been aware”
standard, Delaware follows established principles of equitable
tolling. 109
2.

The Supreme Court’s Past Application of Equitable Tolling

In Burnett v. New York Central Railway Co.,110 the Supreme
Court stated that
[t]he basic question to be answered in determining
whether, under a given set of facts, a statute of
limitations is to be tolled, is one “of legislative intent
whether
the right shall be enforceable . . . after
the prescribed time.” . . . [T]he basic inquiry is
whether congressional purpose is effectuated by

finest lawyers in America to our Bar. The role of the Judiciary
complements the outstanding work of the Bar, the General
Assembly and the Secretary of State’s office.
Id. at 143 (quoting E. Norman Veasey, The Drama of Judicial Branch Change in
this Century, 17 DEL. LAW., Winter 1999/2000, at 4, 4, available at
http://delawarebarfoundation.org/delawyer/Volume17_Number4_Winter19992000.pdf ).
108
In re Tyson Foods, Inc. Consol. S’holder Litig., 919 A.2d 563, 585
(Del. Ch. 2007) (footnote omitted).
109
See supra Part II.C.
110
380 U.S. 424 (1965).
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In Lampf, a group of investors filed complaints against a law
firm under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and SEC Rule 10b-5. 112
The plaintiffs claimed that regardless of whether state or federal
limitation applies, “that period must be subject to the doctrine of
equitable tolling.” 113 Although this case mainly addressed the issue
of whether state or federal periods of limitations apply to a private,
implied claim 114—with the plaintiffs asserting that state common-law
fraud doctrines applied, and defendants arguing that federal-law
limitations period applied 115 —the Court addressed a second issue
related to equitable tolling. 116 The Court stated that statute of
limitations “requirements in law-suits . . . are customarily subject to
‘equitable tolling.’” 117 Thus, “in the usual case, ‘where the party
injured by the fraud remains in ignorance of it without any fault or
want of diligence or care on his part, the bar of the statute does not
begin to run until the fraud is discovered.’” 118 However, the Court
noted that “tolling principles do not apply” where there is a clear

111

Id. at 426–27 (quoting Mid State Horticultural Co. v. Penn. R. Co, 320
U.S. 356, 360 (1943)) (citations omitted).
112
Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow, 501 U.S. 350, 352 (1991);
see also 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013).
113
Lampf, 501 U.S. at 363.
114
These provisions also fall under the scope of insider trading rules, and
are known as the Anti-Fraud Provisions. See infra note 122. At the time of this
suit, “the claim asserted [was] one implied under a statute that also contains an
express cause of action with its own time limitation.” Lampf, 501 U.S. at 359
(emphasis added). Thus, the courts treated a private cause of action under Rule
10b-5 as being implied with no express time limitation, giving rise to the debate on
the applicable statute of limitations. Id. at 353–54.
115
Id. at 354.
116
Id. at 363.
117
Id. (quoting Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95
(1990)).
118
Lampf, 501 U.S. at 363 (quoting Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. 342, 348
(1875)).
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legislative indication of a “cutoff” limitation in the statute. 119 Thus,
the Court found that Rule 10b-5 contained express language
indicating both a statute of limitation and repose: “The 1-year period,
by its terms, begins after discovery of the . . . violation, making
tolling unnecessary. The 3-year limit is a period of repose
inconsistent with tolling.” 120 For the Rule10b-5 claim brought in
Lampf, the clear legislative intent for a period of repose set the claim
apart from the “usual case.” 121
The split decisions of the lower courts regarding section 16(b)
and equitable tolling can be attributed to the ambiguity of the period
of limitation stated within the rule, which is a marked contrast from
the clear language of section 10(b). 122 Section 10(b) offers two time
limitations, thus making it clear that one is a statute of limitation, and
the other is a statute of repose—an absolute cut-off date. Unlike
section 10(b), however, section 16(b) only indicates one period of
limitation. Thus, lower court decisions remained split as to whether
equitable tolling applied to this period—namely, whether the twoyear period was a period of limitation or a period of repose. 123
The current case answers the question of whether a claim
under section 16(b) can be tolled until formal disclosures of short-

119

Id.
Id.; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013).
121
Lampf, 501 U.S. at 363.
122
Section 10(b) is the antifraud provision of the 1934 Act. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b) (2012). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, passed in 2002 and expressly supplying
intent of Congress regarding section 10(b), provides, in relevant part:
120

[A] private right of action that involves a claim of fraud,
deceit, manipulation, or contrivance in contravention of a
regulatory requirement concerning the securities laws . . . may
be brought not later than the earlier of—
(1) 2 years after the discovery of the facts constituting
the violation; or
(2) 5 years after such violation.
28 U.S.C. § 1658(b) (2006).
123
See supra Part II.D.1.
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swing profits have been made pursuant to section 16(a) disclosure
requirements. 124 But it still leaves open the issue of whether
equitable tolling applies at all to section 16(b) claims—the Court was
divided 4-to-4 on whether section 16(b) “establishes a period of
repose that is not subject to tolling.” 125 Thus, this issue may be
decided differently by a majority opinion in the future because this
case carries no precedential effect. 126
The Court has rejected the third school of thought—that the
statute of limitations is tolled until a section 16(a) disclosure is
made. 127 But the Court’s language, with the majority opinion written
by Justice Scalia—“we conclude that, even assuming that the 2-year
period can be extended, the Ninth Circuit erred in determining that it
is tolled until the filing of a § 16(a) statement”—gives no concrete
conclusion about the application of equitable tolling. 128 However,
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion focuses heavily on traditional
equitable tolling principles. 129
Because of the even 4–4 split regarding whether the statutory
period is one of limitation or of repose, the Simmonds decision has
now brought the lower court split down to two schools of thought.130
However, although the opinion explicitly stated that there is no
precedential effect, the Supreme Court, in affirming the Ninth
Circuit’s application of equitable tolling, may have influenced the
circuit courts to lean towards applying equitable tolling principles
rather than going the other way. 131 The next two Parts of this note

124

See infra Part IV for a detailed discussion of the Court’s opinion
regarding this issue.
125
Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. 1414, 1421
(2012).
126
Id.
127
See id. at 1419; see also infra Part IV. The Court unanimously agreed
on this holding with an 8–0 decision (Chief Justice Roberts did not participate).
128
See Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. at 1419.
129
See infra Part IV.
130
Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. at 1421.
131
Id.
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will relay the facts of Simmonds and analyze the Supreme Court’s
decision and findings. 132
III.

FACTS

A. Factual Allegations
This case originated in 2007 when respondent Vanessa
Simmonds filed fifty-five section 16(b) claims against several
financial institutions, including Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC,
which had acted as underwriters for initial public offerings (IPOs) of
various companies. 133 The “alleged factual basis for each of [the]
complaints [was] that the Underwriter Defendants colluded with
insiders of the [issuers] and certain investors in order to personally
profit from underpriced IPOs.”134
Simmonds alleged that the following set of facts supported
liability of the underwriters under section 16(b): (1) the underwriters
were “statutory insiders” as beneficial owners of more than ten
percent of the issuing companies’ stock; (2) the purchase and sale of
shares took place in the “immediate aftermarket” of the IPO, thus not
meeting the six-month limit; (3) there was a “large discrepancy
between the amount . . . paid for the IPO stock and the amount . . .
sold . . . in the immediate aftermarket”; and (4) the underwriters “had
a pecuniary interest in these transactions because they ‘shar[ed] in the
profits of the customers to whom they made IPO allocations of
[issuer] stock’” and because they “allocated ‘shares of [issuer] stock
to executives and . . . insiders of other companies . . . from which
[they] expected to receive new or additional investment banking
business in return.’” 135

132

See infra Parts III, IV.
Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. at 1418 (citations omitted).
134
In re Section 16(b) Litigation, 602 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1206 (W.D.
Wash. 2009).
135
Id. at 1207 (alteration in original). Simmonds’s claim that the
underwriters owned more than ten percent of stock was based on the logic that “as
133
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The underlying actions of the claims took place in the 1990s
and 2000, but the lawsuit was not brought until 2007. 136 Section
16(b) claims are restricted by a statute of limitations of two years. 137
Although Simmonds’s claims were made long after the alleged
actions took place, “Simmonds alleged that the underwriters failed to
comply with [the] requirement [of section 16(a)], thereby tolling
[section] 16(b)’s 2-year time period.” 138
B. Defenses Raised to the Allegations
In their brief to the Supreme Court, the petitioners asserted
that Simmonds could not bring her suit for two reasons. First,
Simmonds’s actions were not timely, since section 16(b) promulgates
a two-year repose period that is not to be extended. 139 Second, even
if the period could have been extended, the underwriter exemption
applied, resulting in no requirement for the underwriters to have filed
a section 16(a) disclosure. 140
The petitioners asserted that the language of section 16(b)
established precisely when the statute of limitations should have
started to run:
Section 16(b) by its plain terms specifies when the
two-year time limit begins to run: on “the date such
[short-swing] profit was realized.” By selecting the

a group, the underwriters and the insiders owned in excess of 10% of the
outstanding stock during the relevant time period.” Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. at 1418.
136
Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. at 1418.
137
See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2012).
138
Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. at 1418 (footnote omitted). Section 16(a) of the
1934 Act requires insiders to disclose change in ownership interests. 15 U.S.C. §
78p(a).
139
Brief for Petitioners at v, Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. 1414 (No. 10-1261)
2011 WL 3678807, at *v.
140
Id. (No. 10-1261) at *35–*36. The Court declined to address the
underwriter exemption, and “express[ed] no view on this issue.” Simmonds, 132 S.
Ct. at 1418 n.4. Both the district court and the court of appeals also declined to
address the issue. See Simmonds v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, 638 F.3d 1072,
1086, 1096 (9th Cir. 2010).
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date the defendant engaged in challenged conduct,
rather than the date the plaintiff discovered such
conduct, as the trigger for the statutory time limit,
Congress indicated that such discovery should not
extend that limit. 141
The petitioners supported their interpretation of congressional
intent with other provisions of the Act and prior Supreme Court
findings:
Congress confirmed the point in companion
provisions . . . which look to a plaintiff’s discovery of
the facts underlying a claim to shorten, not lengthen,
statutory time limits. Indeed, by reference to these
companion provisions, this Court already has
characterized section 16(b)’s time limit as a “period of
repose” that cannot be extended. 142
The petitioners pled for reversal of the Ninth Circuit’s
decision even if the Court were to find an extension of the two-year
limit:
Under no circumstances is there any basis for
extending that time limit beyond the point at which a
reasonably diligent securities owner knew, or should
have known, the facts underlying a Section 16(b)
action. . . . Accordingly, regardless of whether this
Court adopts either a “repose” approach or a “notice”

141

Brief for Petitioners, Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. 1414 (2012) (No. 10-1261)
at *2 (alteration in original) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
142
Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting in part Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind,
Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 360 n.5 (1991)). In Lampf, the
Supreme Court found that Rule 10b’s anti-fraud provision contained a statute of
repose. 501 U.S. at 363.
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approach, 143 this Court should reverse the Ninth
Circuit’s judgment. 144
The petitioners in Simmonds also raised defenses against
Simmonds’s allegations of underwriter liability: “[T]he SEC has
carved out an ‘underwriter exemption’ to allow underwriters to keep
profits from short-swing transactions in the context of public
offerings of securities, even if Section 16(b) would otherwise cover
the underwriting activity.” 145 Simmonds had claimed that the
underwriters in the present suit worked with insiders of the issuing
company and investors in order to gain personal profits from the
IPO. 146
The petitioners acknowledged that the underwriter
exemption applied only for “good faith” actions. 147 They offered
their definition of “good faith” and alleged that Simmonds’s
allegations did not meet this definition: 148
Although the most natural reading of that term is
that the underwriter exemption applies to all bona
fide distributions of shares to the public, respondent
[Simmonds] advanced a far more expansive view of
the “good faith” exception to the underwriter
exemption. Thus, respondent attempted to “plead
around” the underwriter exemption by alleging that
petitioners “lacked good faith in connection with

143

See Litzler v. CC Invs., L.D.C., 362 F.3d 203, 206–07 (2d Cir. 2004),
abrogated by Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. 1414 (2012)
(adopting a version of the notice approach in its equitable tolling application).
144
Brief for Petitioners, Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. 1414 (No. 10-1261) at *3.
145
Id. (No. 10-1261) at *6.
146
Id. (No. 10-1261) at *8; see also supra note 135 and accompanying
text.
147
Id. (No. 10-1261) at *36 (“To be sure, that exemption applies only to
‘good faith’ underwriting.”); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-7(a) (2013).
148
The SEC has not offered any authoritative interpretation of the term
“good faith” as used in this context. Brief for Petitioners, Simmonds, 132 S. Ct.
1414 (No. 10-1261) at *36 (explaining that good faith is a “term that the SEC has
never authoritatively construed”).
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their IPO underwriting and distribution activities” at
issue in each lawsuit because of the underlying
misconduct alleged. 149
Thus, the petitioning underwriters asserted that (1) the
statutory time limit for section 16(b) is a period of repose, rather than
a limitation that can be tolled, and that (2) the underwriter exemption
applied, thus making it impossible for the Ninth Circuit’s standard to
be utilized, as that standard relied on section 16(a) disclosures that
the underwriters were not required to make.
C. Lower Court Proceedings
1.

Trial Court

Simmonds’s fifty-five claims were “consolidated for pretrial
purposes.” 150 The United States District Court for the Western
District of Washington dismissed all complaints—twenty-four of the
motions to dismiss were granted based on the fact that section 16(b)’s
two-year statute of limitations “had expired long before Simmonds
filed the suits.” 151 Thus, the district court did not address the
defendant underwriters’ claim that they were exempt under the
underwriter exemption. 152 The plaintiff-respondent appealed the
decision, and the Ninth Circuit decided the case in 2010.

149

Brief for Petitioners, Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. 1414 (No. 10-1261) at *36
(emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
150
Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. 1414, 1418
(2012).
151
Id.
152
Simmonds v. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC, 638 F.3d 1072, 1086 (9th
Cir. 2010).
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Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Based on the precedent set in Whittaker v. Whittaker Corp., 153
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision in
part. 154 Particularly, the Ninth Circuit reversed “the district court’s
conclusion that all of Simmonds’s claims are time-barred.” 155 In
Whittaker, the Ninth Circuit held that section 16(b)’s statute of
limitations period is “tolled until the insider discloses his transactions
in a Section 16(a) filing, regardless of whether the plaintiff knew or
should have known of the conduct at issue.” 156 The petitioner
underwriters cited Lampf, 157 to argue that “[section] 16(b)’s
limitations period is a period of repose, which is not to be ‘extended
to account for a plaintiff’s discovery of the facts underlying a
claim.’” 158
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari in
2011 to review the issue of “whether the 2-year period to file suit
against a corporate insider under § 16(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 . . . begins to run only upon the insider’s filing of the
disclosure statement required by § 16(a) of the Act.” 159 At the time
of the Supreme Court’s review, the persons who allegedly violated
this rule had yet to file a section 16(a) statement. 160

153

639 F.2d 516 (1981).
Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. at 1418.
155
Simmonds, 638 F.3d at 1099.
156
Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. at 1418 (citation omitted).
157
Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350,
360 (1991).
158
Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. at 1419 (citation omitted).
159
Id. at 1417 (citations omitted).
160
Id. at 1420.
154
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ANALYSIS OF OPINION

In the present case, the statute of limitations at issue concerns
section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 161
Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion in Simmonds,
consisting of one split decision and one unanimous holding. The
Supreme Court was “split 4–4 on the question of whether equitable
tolling even applies to the two-year period for bringing claims under
§ 16(b)” and “effectively left that issue open for another day.” 162 But
the Court did come to a unanimous holding that “assuming the twoyear period can be extended, the tolling rules . . . [of] the Ninth
Circuit and Second Circuit impermissibly deviated from ordinary
equitable tolling principles.” 163
A. The Supreme Court’s Rejection of the Ninth Circuit’s Whittaker
Rule to Section 16(b) Claims
The Supreme Court rejected Simmonds’s argument that the
Whittaker rule applied, basing its rejection on two main rationales.164
First, under what seems to be a congressional intent analysis, the
Court stated that the text of section 16 “simply does not support the
Whittaker rule” because the statute expressly stated that the “2-year
clock starts from ‘the date such profit was realized.’” 165 The Court
noted that “Congress could have very easily provided that ‘no such
suit shall be brought more than two years after the filing of a
statement under subsection (a)(2)(C).” 166

161

See supra Part II.A for a detailed discussion of the rule; see also supra
Part II.C for a discussion of the split of authority for this issue before the Simmonds
decision.
162
Supreme Court Rejects Open-Ended Tolling Of Section 16(b) Claims In
Simmonds, 9 NO. 5 SEC. LITIG. REP. 18 (2012) [hereinafter Supreme Court Rejects
Open-Ended Tolling].
163
Id.
164
Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. at 1419–20.
165
Id. at 1419 (citation omitted).
166
Id. (emphasis in original).
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Second, the Supreme Court noted that the purpose of the
Whittaker rule is “inconsistent with the general purpose of statutes of
limitations,” and that the rule does not coincide with established
principles of equitable tolling. 167 The Court lends a reminder that the
purpose of a statute of limitations is “to protect defendants against
stale or unduly delayed claims.” 168 In addressing equitable tolling,
the Court stated that “[t]he Whittaker court suggested that the
background rule of equitable tolling for fraudulent concealment
operates to toll the limitations period until the § 16(a) statement is
filed.” 169 The Court opined that the Whittaker rationale would
actually be “inequitable” tolling, which is especially apparent in the
present case. 170 It explained that the Whittaker rule’s inequitable
application was exemplified by the fact that the liability theory
regarding underwriters was “so novel that . . . [underwriters] can
plausibly claim that they were not aware they were required to file a
§ 16(a) statement. And where they disclaim the necessity of filing,
the Whittaker rule compels them either to file or to face the prospect
of § 16(b) litigation in perpetuity.” 171 The Court pointed out the
anomaly that Simmonds’s argument would create, because she knew
about the purchase and sale, and had sued, but the underwriters had
not yet filed a section 16(a) disclosure; thus, she still had two years to
sue continually until they file. 172 Even Simmonds acknowledged the
possibility of this inequity. 173
The Supreme Court ultimately relied on a congressional intent
analysis in reaching its decision to “reject [such] a departure from

167

Id.
Id. at 1420 (citation omitted).
169
Id. at 1419 (footnote omitted). “Generally, a litigant seeking equitable
tolling bears the burden of establishing . . . (1) that he has been pursuing his rights
diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.” Id.
(emphasis in original) (citing Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). See
supra, Part II.C–D for a detailed discussion on equitable tolling.
170
Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. at 1420.
171
Id.
172
Id.
173
Id.
168
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settled equitable-tolling principles.” 174 The Court determined, based
on the express words of section 16(b), that the statute of limitations
runs from when profit is realized, stating that “Congress did not
intend that the limitations period be categorically tolled until the
statement is filed: The limitation provision does not say so.” 175 The
Court further explained that “[t]he usual equitable-tolling inquiry” is
sufficient because “the limitations period would not expire until two
years after a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have learned the facts
underlying a § 16(b) action.” 176 The Court supported its ruling
regarding the sufficiency of the usual equitable tolling principles by
explaining that when courts apply a doctrine or principle to an issue
that Congress is silent about, they may “permit[] an inference that
Congress intended to apply ordinary background . . . principles,” and
not that Congress “intended to apply an unusual modification of
those rules.” 177
B. The Unsettled Issue of Whether the Equitable Tolling Principle
Applies to Section 16(b)’s Time Limit
Although the Court held that section 16(b)’s “limitation . . .
period is not tolled until” a section 16(a) statement is filed, it
expressly stated that “[w]e are divided 4 to 4 concerning, and thus
affirm without precedential effect, the Court of Appeals’ rejection of
petitioners’ contention that § 16(b) establishes a period of repose that
is not subject to tolling.” 178
But in affirming the Ninth Circuit’s application of equitable
tolling, although without precedential effect, the Court may have
influenced the courts of appeals to apply equitable tolling rather than
go the other way. And because of the dearth of section 16(b)

174

Id.
Id.
176
Id.
177
Id. at 1421 (emphasis in original) (quoting Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S.
280, 286 (2003)).
178
Id.
175
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litigation in recent years, it may take some time before the issue is
brought before a circuit court, especially one that had applied the
“repose” school of thought prior to the Simmonds decision. 179
V.

IMPACT

Because the Supreme Court essentially left the issue of the
applicability of ordinary principles of equitable tolling open, it is
necessary to peer into the decisions of several courts to find how each
court may differently treat a section 16(b) claim—some courts of
appeals may not apply equitable tolling at all, and some courts may
apply general principles of equitable tolling. Unfortunately, too few
cases have been heard on this issue, both before and after Simmonds.
This section will summarize interpretations that have formed after
Simmonds, and then refer to impacts resulting from the Supreme
Court’s holding on another provision pertaining to insider trading.
A. Interpretations of the Simmonds Decision
“Lower courts now will have to decide how traditional
principles of equitable tolling apply, and may consider anew whether
equitable tolling should even apply to § 16(b).” 180 Thus, this issue
will likely go to the Supreme Court again—someday—and at that
time, the Court may decide that equitable tolling need not apply at
all. 181 In the Securities Litigations Report, however, the authors
viewed the Supreme Court as “favoring strict statutory interpretation
to define the scope of the federal securities laws.” 182 It elaborated by
explaining that the Court “narrowly construe[s] the private rights of
action arising under the federal securities laws to curb the

179

Most section 16(b) claims have been brought in the Ninth and Second
Circuits, and both courts have traditionally applied equitable tolling principles to
those causes of action. This fact, coupled with the small number of section 16(b)
cases, means the chances of this issue being brought up in a different circuit court
in the short to mid term are likely low.
180
Supreme Court Rejects Open-Ended Tolling, supra note 162, at 19.
181
Id.
182
Id.
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development of novel and expansive theories of liability that
Congress did not contemplate or expressly authorize.” 183 After all,
section 16(b) clearly states that a cause of action exists for two years
after profits are made—which some may interpret as a period of
repose. In the future, much of the decision may depend on how
easily detectable short-swing profits are in measuring the fairness of
applying a short, two-year period of repose.
B. Subsequent Lower Court Decisions
After the reinforcement of other provisions regulating insider
trading, “The number of reported § 16(b) cases has declined
significantly in the last two decades.” 184 Two likely factors for this
decrease are “improved distribution of information about the dangers
of inadvertent violations” and “exemptive regulations promulgated
by the SEC in 1991 and 1996” regarding section 16(b) liability.185
Thus, as a result of the recency of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Simmonds, and the lack of cases arising under section 16(b) in
general, very few subsequent cases have come before the federal
courts. Thus far, the few subsequent cases involving section 16(b)
litigation originate from New York, the financial capital of the world,
and only one directly applies the Simmonds decision.
In Chechele v. Morgan Stanley, the plaintiff, Chechele, sued
Morgan Stanley and its subsidiaries, seeking disgorgement of shortswing profits. 186 The District Court for the Southern District of New
York, relying on the Supreme Court decision in Simmonds, departed
from the old Second Circuit precedent, which mandated that tolling
end when the plaintiff “gets actual notice that a person subject to

183

Id. at 20.
HAMILTON, MACEY & MOLL, supra note 22, at 929.
185
Id. “The last sentence of § 16(b) grants the SEC power to exempt
transactions from that section if they are ‘not comprehended within the purpose of
this subsection.’” Id.
186
896 F. Supp. 2d 297, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
184
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section 16(a) has realized specific short-swing profits.” 187 With the
old Second Circuit rule overturned, Chechele followed the Supreme
Court’s Simmonds holding and applied the Second Circuit’s usual
principle for equitable tolling: “we will apply the equitable tolling
doctrine ‘as a matter of fairness’ where plaintiff has been ‘prevented
in some extraordinary way from exercising his rights.’” 188 The court
found that the plaintiff knew or should have known “the facts
necessary to plead her section 16(b) claim more than two years”
before filing the complaint. 189 It held that she did not (1) “pursu[e]
her rights diligently” or (2) show “that some extraordinary
circumstance stood in her way.” 190 Because these were two essential
elements to toll a statute of limitations for fraud, the court dismissed
her action as “time-barred.” 191
C. Other Influential Supreme Court Decisions on Statute of Repose
for Insider Trading Provisions and Congressional Response
Having only answered one of the issues—regardless of
whether equitable tolling applies, the clock does not run after a
required disclosure—the Supreme Court has left the question of
whether equitable tolling even applies to section 16(b) at all for
another day. To address the question of how the Court may decide if
this issue were brought up again, it would be helpful to review other
Supreme Court decisions regarding related provisions in securities
law. The most obvious provision to analyze would be section 10(b)
and the accompanying Rule 10b-5’s anti-fraud provisions. It would

187

Id. at 302 (quoting Litzler v. CC Invs., L.D.C., 362 F.3d 203, 208 (2d
Cir. 2004), abrogated by Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Simmonds, 132 S. Ct.
1414 (2012)).
188
Chechele, 896 F. Supp. 2d at 303 (quoting Miller v. Int’l Tel. & Tel.
Corp., 755 F.2d 20, 24 (2d Cir. 1985)). The court further emphasized that “we had
in mind a situation where a plaintiff ‘could show that it would have been
impossible for a reasonably prudent person to learn’ about his or her cause of
action.” Id. (emphasis in original).
189
Chechele, 896 F. Supp. 2d at 304.
190
Id. (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 125 S. Ct. 1807, 1814 (2005)).
191
Chechele, 896 F. Supp. 2d at 304.
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also be beneficial to review the legislature’s reaction to the Court’s
Rule 10b-5 limitation period decision in order to better understand
Congress’s administrative intent.
This section will first discuss how section 10(b) relates to
section 16(b) and then analyze the procedural and legislative history
of the provision’s statutory time limit in order to catch a glimpse of
how the Supreme Court and Congress may react to a future claim
based on a section 16(b) issue. Finally, this section will detail other
comments and opinions to gain insight into the views of some of the
Justices.
1.

The Supreme Court’s Decisions on Section 10(b)’s Period of
Limitation

Aside from section 16(b) of the 1934 Act, most insider
trading cases arise under Rule 10b-5 claims—section 10(b) and the
SEC’s accompanying Rule 10b-5 “are the principal statutory
weapons against fraud. Section 10b is the antifraud provision of the
Exchange Act, while Rule 10b-5 is the rule the SEC promulgated
under that section.” 192 Before statutory limitations periods existed,
courts generally utilized four different alternatives in applying a
statutory limitations period to fraud claims, 193 with one of the
methods borrowing language from section 16(b):
(1) apply by analogy the statutes of limitations
applicable to private remedies under Section 13 of
the 1933 Act; (2) apply the forum state’s statute of
limitations for common law fraud; (3) apply the

192

Legal Info. Inst., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, CORNELL
UNIVERSITY
LAW
SCHOOL,
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/securities_exchange_act_of_1934 (last visited
Oct. 25, 2013). “Rule 10b-5 prohibits the use of any ‘device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud,’ and creates liability for any misstatement or omission of a material fact,
or one that investors would think was important to their decision to buy or sell the
stock.” Id.
193
HAZEN, supra note 39, § 12.16[1].
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statute of limitations for securities fraud under the
forum state’s blue sky law; 194 or (4) apply the
limitations period from section 9(e), section 16(b),
or section 18(a). . . . 195
Beginning in 1988, Rule 10b-5 authorized private rights of action
through express congressional measures. 196 However, Congress
remained silent as to the legislative intent regarding the statute of
limitations.
Finally, in 1991, the issue of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5’s
statute of limitations came before the Supreme Court in Lampf. 197 In
the Lampf decision, the Court held that “[l]itigation instituted
pursuant to § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 . . . must be commenced within
one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation and
within three years after such violation.” 198 In effect, the Supreme
Court had created a one-year statute of limitations—running from the
time of discovery of the violation—and a three-year statute of repose
that would not be affected by any tolling doctrines. The Court based
its decision on the following rationale:
[A] court should look first to the statute of origin to
ascertain the proper limitations period. We can
imagine no clearer indication of how Congress would
have balanced the policy considerations implicit in
194

See supra Part II.B for a description of state common law fraud time
limitations and blue sky laws.
195
HAZEN, supra note 39, § 12.16[1]. The limitation for private remedies
deemed the period to be “one year from discovery or reasonable discovery but no
more than three years after the sale or, if applicable, from the public offering.” Id.
Section 9(e), now called section 9(f), states the limitation as “one-year from
discovery, three years after violation.” Id. at n.3. Section 18(a) prescribes the
period to be “one year from discovery, thee years after the violation.” See also 15
U.S.C. § 77m (2012).
196
HAZEN, supra note 39, § 12.16; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l.
197
See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S.
350 (1991); see also Part II.D.2.
198
Lampf, 501 U.S. at 364; see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013), for
details on Rule 10b-5.
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any limitations provisions than the balance struck by
the same Congress in limiting similar and related
protections. 199
Following this rationale, the Court relied on other provisions
of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. 200 The Court commented on the standard
of application that a lower court should use in the absence of a
finding of a clear legislative intent:
Where a federal cause of action tends in practice to
“encompass numerous and diverse topics and
subtopics,” such that a single state limitations
period may not be consistently applied within a
jurisdiction, we have concluded that the federal
interests in predictability and judicial economy
counsel the adoption of one source, or class of
sources, for borrowing purposes. 201
This statement alludes to a favor of uniformity in application of a
statute of limitations and repose to further legitimate federal interests
and policy considerations.

199

Lampf, 501 U.S. at 359.
DAVID A. LIPTON, 15A BROKER-DEALER REG. § 5:30 (2011-2012).
The existing statutes that the Court relied on were as follows: 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e),
15 U.S.C. § 78r(c), and 15 U.S.C. § 77m. Id. Also, regarding distinctions in
terminology for the different one- and three-year periods within the 1933 and 1934
Acts, the Court noted, “To the extent that these distinctions in the future might
prove significant, we select as the governing standard for an action under § 10(b)
the language of . . . 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e).” Lampf, 501 U.S. at 364 n.9. The majority
opinion, written by Justice Blackmun, briefly addressed section 16(b); it had been
considered for reliance but ultimately dismissed from consideration because its
focus—disgorgement of unlawful profits—differed from section 10(b). Id. at 360
n.5. Another possible reason, although not stated in the opinion, could be because
section 16(b) did not contain the two-tiered limitation structure that section 10(b)
and the others contained.
201
Lampf, 501 U.S. at 357.
200
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Congressional Response to Lampf: Affirmed in Part

Congress expressed its agreement with the Lampf decision on
two occasions following 1991. First, within one year of the Supreme
Court’s decision, Congress added section 27A to the 1934 Act, which
provided that for private civil actions under section 10(b), “the
limitations period is that provided by the laws applicable in the
jurisdiction as they existed on June 19, 1991.” 202 Although this
addition denied retroactive application of the Lampf decision, it also
acknowledged the statute of limitation and repose set by the Court’s
holding for future actions. The second instance occurred in
concurrence with efforts to recover from the accounting scandals of
2002. 203 Congress passed a new Act, which provided more concrete
recognition of the issues discussed in Lampf and the need to
expressly state a statute of limitations and repose:

202

LIPTON, supra note 200; see also 15 U.S.C. § 78aa-1.
“Numerous events involving fraud and misconduct . . . shocked and
angered both the business community and ordinary investors. Investors began to
bail out of securities holdings, and a sharp decline in securities prices followed.”
HAMILTON, MACEY & MOLL, supra note 22, at 547. Although several corporate
wrongdoings define this era, “Undoubtedly, the most violent initial shock . . . was
the unexpected collapse of Enron Corporation in November, 2001.” Id. at 541.
Just one year earlier, Enron had been hailed by Fortune magazine as one of the
most admired companies. Id. at 542; see also Nicholas Stein, The World’s Most
Admired Companies, FORTUNE, Oct. 2, 2000, at 182. Enron and thirteen affiliates
had filed for bankruptcy as a result of overstating earnings and creating “special
purpose entities” to hide “very substantial liabilities and avoid disclosure.”
HAMILTON, MACEY & MOLL, supra note 22, at 542. The once prominent
accounting firm Arthur Andersen also collapsed with the scandal, as it had been the
auditor for Enron—the firm “had engaged in a ‘cleaning’ of Enron files related to
its financial activities shortly before Enron collapsed, and as a result was convicted
of obstruction of justice.” Id. at 543. Another notable collapse was that of
WorldCom, a telecommunications corporation. The company announced in 2002
that it had overstated profits by categorizing certain expenses as capital investments
instead. Id. at 543–44. Senior executives “were arrested and charged with
securities fraud, conspiracy to commit securities fraud and making false statements
to the SEC.” Id. at 544. For a more detailed account of the series of events leading
up to the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, see id. at 540–49.
203
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In July 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
[(SOX)] . . . was signed into law. This Act,
approved by nearly unanimous votes in both houses
of Congress . . . . amended a general statute of
limitation which applies to civil actions arising
under Acts of Congress. . . . The [SOX] amendment
provided that, notwithstanding the general
limitations period, a separate statute of limitations
will apply to a private action, involving “a claim of
fraud, deceit, manipulation, or contrivance in
contravention of a regulatory requirement
concerning the ‘securities laws.’’ 204
Congress altered the Supreme Court’s decision in Lampf to
declare that the statute of limitations is two years and the statute of
repose is five years. 205
Courts have limited SOX application to Rule 10b-5, based on
a distinction found in the texts of the Act’s provisions that read: “The
violations to which SOX’s limitations apply sound in fraud. Many of
the ‘anti-fraud’ provisions of the securities acts, however, on their
face, apply to misstatements which might or might not involve
fraud.” 206 Most recently, in Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, the Supreme
Court, for the first time, interpreted the two-year statute of limitations
set by SOX. 207 The Court held that “a cause of action accrues (1)

204

LIPTON, supra note 200 (footnotes omitted); see also 28 U.S.C. §

1658(b).
205

28 U.S.C. § 1658(b). In Lampf, the Solicitor General had “appear[ed]
on behalf of the [SEC] . . . urg[ing] the application of [a] 5-year statute of repose.”
Lampf, 501 U.S. at 355. The Court had rejected this for other limitations written in
the original Acts. However, Justice Kennedy’s dissent pointed towards no period
of repose for fraud-based claims or, as the Solicitor General urged and as Congress
later implemented, a reasonable five-year period. See id. at 374–79 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting); see also infra Part VI for a further explanation of his dissent.
206
28 U.S.C. § 1658(b).
207
130 S. Ct. 1784 (2010). The case involved a claim brought by a group
of investors against Merck for “knowingly misrepresent[ing] the risks of heart
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when the plaintiff did in fact discover, or (2) when a reasonably
diligent plaintiff would have discovered, ‘the facts constituting the
violation’—whichever comes first.” 208 The Court deemed, and all
parties agreed, that “discovery” referred “not only to a plaintiff’s
actual discovery of certain facts, but also to the facts that a
reasonably diligent plaintiff would have discovered.” 209 It further
noted that “[f]raud is deemed to be discovered . . . when, in the
exercise of reasonable diligence, it could have been discovered.” 210
VI.

CONCLUSION

Although the decision in Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC
v. Simmonds does give guidelines on the limits of equitable tolling
for section 16(b) claims, the Supreme Court’s split decision still
leaves this issue unresolved.
Justice Blackmun, who wrote for the majority in Lampf,
expressly stated, “Section 16(b) . . . sets a 2-year rather than a 3-year
period of repose.” 211 Justice Scalia, in his concurrence, did not raise
issue with this statement. 212 Justice Kennedy wrote a separate dissent
in which he generally disagreed with the application of any short
period of repose for fraud-based actions, and indicated that only in
rare circumstances could a five-year repose period be imposed. 213 He
had, however, also opined that “[a] reasonable statute of repose . . . is
not without its merits. It may sometimes be easier to determine when

attacks accompanying the use of Merck’s pain-killing drug” and brought an action
for securities fraud under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. Id. at 1790.
208
Id. at 1789–90.
209
Id. at 1793 (emphasis in original). The Court commented that the word
“discover” in statute of limitations determinations was often connected to the
“discovery rule” doctrine, which “delays accrual of a cause of action until the
plaintiff has ‘discovered’ it.” Id.
210
Id. at 1794.
211
Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350,
360 n.5 (1991) (emphasis added).
212
See id. at 364–69 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
213
Id. at 377–78 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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a fraud occurred than when it should have been discovered.” 214 He
thus indicated that in some types of claims, he would not be as closed
to the possibility of a statute of repose, so long as it would not upset
principles of fairness. In his Lampf dissent, Justice Kennedy stated a
key point—the limitation statutes that the Majority relied on
“appl[ied] to strict liability violations.” 215 Section 16(b) is also a
form of strict liability. Will the Court turn to its Lampf methodology
or depart from it? Will it consider the congressional trend toward
administering both a statute of limitations and a statute of repose?
As for the legislature, through its decisions in adopting SOX
and the other regulations preceding it, Congress is moving towards
administering a dual time limitation structure of (1) a shorter statute
of limitations from time of discovery and (2) a longer statute of
repose. And as discussed earlier, Congress has applied shorter statute
of repose periods for strict liability type provisions.
The Supreme Court may have fortunately, or conveniently,
avoided a final decision involving the sensitive task of interpreting
legislative intent, this time, with Simmonds. And it may very well
have dodged the task of resolving this issue for a substantial time to
come, thanks to difficulties explained earlier in this case note—
namely, a dearth of section 16(b) litigation. But unless legislation
does away with section 16 of the 1934 Act, the Supreme Court will
have to address the split of opinion among the courts—and an
important factor in its analysis will likely be how readily
discoverable section 16 violations are, and the importance of striking
a balance of fairness between the claimants and the alleged violators.

214
215

Id. at 378.
Id. at 376.

